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Introduction 
When Immanuel Kant wrote his Critique ofPure Reason he significantly changed the 
business ofmetaphysics. Metaphysics had traditionally tried to detennine what the true 
nature of an object was, independent of ourselves as the observers. Kant, however, 
proposed a system in which our cognitive apparatus imposed certain conditions upon 
objects in order for us to understand them. We could not ever hope to know the object in 
itself, but by discovering the nature ofour cognitive system, we could come to know 
certain truths, and we could know these truths with absolute certainty. "Objectivity" thus 
becomes identified with the structure of subjectivity. 
In his second Critique, the Critique ofPractical Reason, Kant concerns himself with 
the issue of morality. In particular, he wishes to establish the reality of freedom, the 
existence of an immortal soul, and the existence of God. Kant desperately wants to 
defend the possibility of morality, but without freedom, we appear simply to live in an 
amoral, phenomenally detennined, world. Kant wishes to ascribe to us both moral 
culpability and moral obligation, but he must attempt to do this within the context of the 
epistemology set forth in the first Critique. 
This essay contains four major divisions. The first is a review ofKant's system of 
theoretical knowledge set out in his Critique ofPure Reason. Next I will discuss the 
Critique ofPure Reason paying specific attention to those areas of the book where he 
makes room for the possibility of Practical Knowledge. Third I move on to Kant's 
Critique ofPractical Reason. In this section I intend to discuss what possibility he 
presents for Practical knowledge and compare and contrast that treatment with the one 
given in Critique ofPure Reason. Finally I discuss what conclusions we may reach 
regarding two primary questions: "Are these two systems consistent?" and "Are the 
grounds for practical knowledge adequate to the conclusions Kant wishes to derive from 
them? 
~ 
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I. The Limits of Theoretical Knowledge in the Critique ofPure Reason 
A. The Difference Between the A and B Preface 
"Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is 
burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not 
able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer." I 
The opening lines of the Preface to the First Edition rank among the most crisp, clear and 
concise opening paragraphs ever written. Kant gives his take on what the problem is and 
the rest of the Critique is his attempt at finding some solution. 
Both the A and B Prefaces are riddled with political metaphor. In the A Preface Kant 
refers to metaphysics as the Queen of all the sciences. He claims this noble monarchy to 
have been mishandled under the administration of the dogmatists, and he scorns skeptics 
as "a species of nomads, despising all settled modes oflife.,,2 The impression given is 
one strongly in favor of the monarchy of Queen Metaphysics, and Kant wishes to restore 
her to her rightful throne and repair whatever damage has been done to her position. 
In the B Preface, however, the tone is different. No longer does Kant speak of 
restoration and repair. Now Kant is the proponent of a revolution, and what's more, he 
wishes to be the leader of it. "A revolution brought about by the happy thought of a single 
man, the experiment which he devised marking out the path upon which the science must 
enter, and by following which, secure progress throughout all time and in endless 
expansion is infallibly secured.,,3 Here he wishes to follow suite with the sciences of 
mathematics (divided into geometry and arithmetic) and mostly physics. His primary 
model for this revolution to set metaphysics along the path of a secure science is the 
revolution he believes that Newton effected in physics. 
IKant, Immanuel, Critique ofPure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York, 
St. Martin's Press, 1965) p.7 
2Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.8 
3Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.l9 
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8. The Problem as Stated in the Introduction 
"The proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are a priori 
synthetic judgments possible? Upon the solution of this problem, or upon a sufficient 
proof that the possibility which it desires to have explained does in fact not exist at all, 
depends the success or failure ofmetaphysics."4 This is the general problem of pure 
reason in Kant's estimation, but why is this so? 
In the Critique ofPure Reason Kant undertakes to answer two questions: I.) What can 
we know? and 2.) How do we know it? As indicated in the A and B Prefaces, Kant wants 
to establish metaphysics as a science, and the business ofmetaphysics, as properly 
understood in the first Critique, is to determine the limits of theoretical knowledge. 
Before plunging directly into that pursuit, however, he defines the necessary 
requirements for any science. There are two such qualifying factors for a science. The 
first is that it must establish certainty. Without certainty, science cannot ever progress 
because it has no solid foundation upon which to build. At any moment, a future 
discovery may render all previous theories obsolete. There is no set point of departure and 
no rational basis for one set of theories to be preferred over any other. The other 
criteria is that it be ampliative in nature. It must in some way extend our knowledge base. 
If a science provides us with no possibility for the extension of our knowledge than it is 
equally unable to make progress in any conventional sense, and is therefore of little use to 
us. 
Kant speaks ofjudgments as having an a priori or a posteriori quality. A posteriori 
judgments are made through the aid of experience and thus tell us only what is, and not 
that it necessarily must be that way. They provide us with the quidfacti information, but 
offer no demonstration quidjuris. Further, these judgments do not allow any strict 
universality, for we can only assert that in all cases that we have observed thus far there is 
no exception to this rule. A priori judgments, however, are judgments which, in being 
though, must be thought of as necessary. All apples are apples. This is an example of an 
analytic a priori judgment. It is not necessary to wake up early and scan the orchards to 
verify the truth of this statement; it is inexorably true. These judgments must be universal 
allowing no exception to the rule. Since an a priori judgment does not rely on any 
4Kant, Critique ofPure Reason. p.SS 
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experience for its legitimacy, no appeal to possible future experience can ever show a 
judgment of this kind to be false. 
Judgments are further categorized as being of analytic or synthetic character. Kant 
distinguishes between these two types by defining an analytic judgment as one in which 
the predicate '8' belongs to the subject 'A' as being something which is entirely within 
the concept of'A' from the beginning. Synthetic judgments have a predicate '8' which 
stands outside the concept'A', although it is connected with it. In making analytic 
judgments we do not in any way expand our knowledge of the subject'A', but rather 
something that we already knew about'A' has been made more intelligible. Analytic 
judgments are logical truths and hence must be true. Synthetic judgments mayor may not 
be true. In making synthetic judgments we must have some factor X which allows us to 
know that a predicate not contained within the concept of the subject nevertheless 
belongs to it. This factor X is the given, or the power of an object to create a 
representation in my mind. The actual "synthesis" in synthetic judgments lies in the 
predicate of the proposition being combined with and subsumed under the subject. 
Analytic a priori judgments, preferred by the Rationalists, provide certainty, but are 
inadequate for the foundation of a science because they offer no means by which to 
expand our knowledge. Synthetic a posteriori judgments, preferred by the Empiricists, 
are ampliative in nature and may provide probability, but are lacking the certainty 
necessary to support the growth of a science. Only synthetic a priori judgments could 
provide the essential basis for any truly scientific progress. 
To make any synthetic a priori judgments then, we must combine in thought a certain 
predicate concept with a certain subject concept, and this synthesis must be inherently 
necessary within the concepts themselves. If we accept the possibility of synthetic a 
priori judgments we allow ourselves a means to extend our a priori knowledge. Ifwe 
reject the possibility of such judgments then we cannot undertake to expand our 
knowledge of things universally and can only hope to claritY concepts ofwhich we are 
already aware. For without the ability to make synthetic a priori judgments we are simply 
"the unqualified historian or critic passing judgments upon the groundless assertions of 
others by means of [our] own, which are equally groundless."S 
SKant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.60 
m 
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Ifthere is to be a science ofmetaphysics, at its foundation must be judgments which 
are absolutely certain and yet able to extend our knowledge. How is this possible? 
Through judgments which are both synthetic and a priori. 
C. Transcendental Aesthetic 
"The science of all principles ofa priori sensibility I call transcendental aesthetic."6 
The Transcendental Aesthetic is designed to investigate four notions. The first of these 
notions is the passive or receptive faculty called sensibility. This is followed by the 
conditions of space and time, and finally the possibility of mathematics as a science. 
Kant speaks of intuition as that through which a mode of knowledge is in immediate 
relation with an object and towards which all thought as a means is directed. Intuition can 
only take place insofar as an object is given to us. The capacity for receiving a 
representation of an object, or for the mind to be affected in a certain way through a 
particular mode of knowledge is defined by Kant as this passive, receptive faculty called 
sensibility. The givenness of an objet is only possible insofar as we are able to receive and 
process sensory information. As the information is thus processed and understood we 
develop empirical concepts. 
It is that actual thing in the appearance which corresponds to sensation that Kant calls 
matter. We are unable as sensible intuitors to understand or perceive this external matter 
for its true and objective nature because we are unable to escape the dimensions of our 
own perception. We can only perceive things in the way that we actually do perceive 
things, namely as appearances and not as things-in-themselves. Since Kant insists that 
sensibility is purely passive and receptive, he commits himself to a position that matter 
cannot be purely passive. His notion of the given requires matter to impinge upon our 
faculty of sensibility. 
This creates some degree ofdifficulty for Kant. He will later argue that "causality" is 
an a priori category. These categories however, by Kant's own decree, may only properly 
be applied to objects of possible sense experience and not to things-in-themselves, or 
noumena. Yet he also holds that all knowledge begins with the givenness of sensations. 
These sensations are consequences of matter completely outside of my control acting 
6Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.66 
upon my faculty of sensibility, and yet he cannot accurately state that this matter causes 
me to have these impressions. This is impermissible because it extends the use of a 
category beyond possible sense impressions to noumena. This difficulty, if it is to be 
resolved at all, persists until Kant attempts to explain the Third and Fourth Antinomies. 
This attempt at resolution and its importance will be discussed in the section on the Third 
and Fourth Antinomies. 
While it is impossible, in Kant's view, to have any a priori knowledge ofmatter, it is 
necessary that we have a priori knowledge of the forms of sensibility. These forms are the 
variety in appearance that allows us to classify information according to certain types. 
Since forms are that through which sensations may be posited and ordered in a certain 
model, they cannot in themselves be sense impressions. Therefore, while the matter 
behind all appearances is given to us a posteriori only, its form lies ready for these 
sensations a priori in the mind. For this reason it must be kept separate from all 
sensation. This whole notion fits nicely in an analogy of the movies. We see appearances 
of actors and actresses on the screen, but only appearances and not the people themselves. 
These people are matter and the appearances we see of them are our sensations. The form 
however is the screen. For while we only see the appearances of actors on the screen and 
not the screen itself, we must posit the existence of the screen because otherwise we 
would not be able to see the representations projected upon it. 
Kant describes as pure intuitions that which remains from an empirical intuition ifwe 
strip it of everything received by sensibility a posteriori (impenetrability, hardness, color, 
etc.) and everything which the understanding thinks about it (substance, force, 
divisibility, etc.). What remains of the intuition is extension and figure. These belong to 
pure intuition as forms of sensibility even when there is no actual object perceived by the 
senses. "There are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principles ofa priori 
knowledge, namely space and time."? 
Space and time, to Kant, are both real and ideal. Insofar as I experience objects as side 
by side, in empirical intuition, space is empirically real. It is the condition by which I 
experience anything external as real. Insofar as I experience anything in sequence, in 
empirical intuition, time is real. It is the condition by which I experience anything 
external or internal as real. But inasmuch as space and time are not conditions of 
?Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.67 
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things-in-themselves, but rather only forms of my sensibility, space and time are both 
transcendentally ideal. 
We are sensible intuitors and our sensibility is spacio-temporal. One can easily 
understand the argument for space and time being empirically real, for no one may 
conceive of an object not existing in space or an occurrence not existing in some 
sequential relation to any other occurrence. The argument is more complicated for why 
time and space cannot be extended to things-in-themselves. 
First we must recall that we are not able to have any sense experience of noumena. All 
that we perceive through sensibility are representations given by a particular object. 
While some people shared the view with Kant that we could not crawl outside of our 
heads to see if the real world actually corresponds to the contents of our consciousness, 
many believed in a correspondence theory of truth. 
The "similitude theory of reference" is a way of expressing the view that external 
objects must be in some way similar to the representations they create in our minds, even 
if not exactly alike. For instance, if! perceive the appearance of an object six feet by four 
feet with a flat, rectangular surface and four protrusions reaching to the floor, one from 
each comer, then it seems that there must be something "out there" that is very similar to 
the table I just described; it corresponds with the contents of my consciousness. 
Otherwise, why would I have these particular representations? While there was no way to 
check and make sure if this was so, it seemed to make sense, and for that reason was a 
widely held belief. After all, even in Kant's system where one cannot have any experience 
of things-in-themselves, isn't it possible that things just happen to actually be 
spacio-temporal? Granting that we have no way to prove it, doesn't that possibility exist? 
Kant's answer to this is no, and the reason why is that if space and time could be 
extended to apply as conditions of things-in-themselves then subjects would have to 
admit of impossible predicates. Probably the most famous example of such an 
impossibility comes from leno of Elea. This is the paradox of bisection, or dichotomy. 
Suppose there is a given distance between you and a door. Zeno holds that you could 
never actually exit through that door because before you are able to reach it you must 
arrive at the point halfway between the door and your starting position. But before you 
can reach the halfway point you must travel half of the way there. But first you must get 
halfway to that point! In the end you are required to traverse an infinite number of points 
before you could reach the door and exit. Since it is impossible to cross an infinite 
number of points, because an infinite series is one which, by definition, cannot be 
m 
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completed, you cannot ever actually get there. Analogously, if things themselves were 
spacio-temporal then, like Zeno's paradox, they too would be self-contradictory. This is 
why Kant states that space and time are transcendentally only ideal, and asserts instead a 
coherence theory of truth. 
For mathematics to be a science, by Kant's definition, there must be some way to show 
how synthetic a priori judgments are possible in mathematics. He does not, however, 
attempt to complete his grounding ofmathematics as a science until the Transcendental 
Analytic. This is because a science can be grounded only when it is shown to be 
objectively valid, and objective validity requires that a judgment can be applied to real 
possible objects, or objects of experience. "Even space and time, however free their 
concepts are from everything empirical, and however certain it is that they are represented 
in the mind completely a priori, would yet be without objective validity, senseless and 
meaningless, if their necessary application to the objects of experience were not 
established...Apart from these objects of experience, they would be devoid of meaning. 
And so it is with concepts of every kind."S 
Kant does believe he has shown how synthetic a priori judgments are possible in 
mathematics. These judgments are supposed to be like universal rules, and so applicable 
to particular instances. However, their a priori character necessitates that they cannot 
themselves be derived from such particulars. The synthetic a priori judgments of 
mathematics describe the organization of space and time, particulars which are not 
objects of sensibility but are found in experience. 
Kant demonstrates that space is a particular by the fact that there is only one space. 
This one space is infinite in magnitude and has infinitely many divisions within it, instead 
of infinitely many instances subsumed under it. These divisions, or all other spaces, can 
be seen as homogenous parts of the one all-embracing space. 
Kant is not using the science ofmathematics as his model for metaphysics, but instead 
will get that design from natural science. This is because, although the judgments made in 
science must be synthetic a priori, the fact that these judgments are not a schematized 
category or a principle keeps them outside the realm ofmetaphysics. 
SKant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.193 
~ 
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D. Transcendental Analytic 
The Transcendental Analytic is an immensely important division of the Critique of 
Pure Reason and its significance requires that a proportional amount of energy be spent in 
explaining its purposes. It is in this section that Kant discusses The Table ofJudgments 
and The Table ofCategories, the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience (namely 
The Unity ofExperience through The Synthesis ofApprehension in Intuition, The 
Synthesis ofReproduction in Imagination, and The Synthesis ofRecognition in a 
Concept), The Schematism ofthe Pure Concepts ofUnderstanding (Categories), and the 
Analogies ofExperience. These topics will be considered and review in the preceding 
order. 
\. Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories begins with the Table of 
Judgments. All meaningful judgments conform to a certain structure. "Judgment[s] can 
be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments.,,9 These "heads" are 
Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, and the "moments" can easily be seen along 
with them as follows: 
Table of Judl!ments 
I. Quantity II. Quality III. Relation IV. Modality 
Universal Affirmative Categorical Problematic 
Particular Negative Hypothetical Assertoric 
Singular Infinite Disiunctive Apodeictic 
Kant bases this table on his observation ofjudgments and believes this to be an 
exhaustive list of the forms which they may take. Every judgment has one moment from 
each of the heads represented. 
The Understanding is the active, non-sensuous faculty of knowledge. Judgments are 
products of our understanding. As such, their structure reflects how the Understanding 
functions. Kant's Copernican hypothesis states that the Understanding prescribes to 
Nature the structure it must possess if it is to be an object of experience for us. It does this 
by employing concepts in judgments. The categories are just these a priori concepts. "To 
discover the basic logical functions ofjudgments is to discover the legislative structure of 
9Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.1 06 
~ 
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the Understanding."\O This is why the Table of Categories corresponds almost exactly to 
the Table of Judgments. 
Table of Catelwries 
I. Quantity II. Quality III. Relation IV. Modality 
Unity Reality Substance PossibilitylImpossibility 
Plurality Negation Causality ExistencelNon-existence 
Totality Limitation Community Necessarv/Contin~encv 
The Understandings principle operation is synthesis. All judgments are concerned with 
somehow synthesizing some subject S with some predicate P. The "heads" of these tables 
represent four distinct aspects of synthesis. A judgment therefore displays that which has 
already been synthesized by the Understanding. The object of this synthesis is whatever it 
is that was given through the senses and conditioned by space and time, the a priori forms 
of intuition. The Table of Categories are therefore the organizing principles of the 
understanding. Kant sees twelve kinds of cookies and these are the judgments. He then 
reasons that there must be twelve kinds of cookie cutters, and they must correspond with 
the cookies they produce. This is how he arrives at the Categories. 
2. The a priori grounds for the possibility of all experience is the synthesis of the 
manifold of intuition into the unity of experience. Kant has followed Newton's model for 
analysis or inductive method in his "Metaphysical Deduction" of the categories 
proceeding from the effects (judgments) to the causes inferred by them (the categories). In 
the "Transcendental Deduction" he will follow Newton's model for synthesis or 
deductive method which assumes the categories as principles and proceeds to use those 
principles to explain the phenomena which ensues and to prove that explanation. This 
"method is intended to show that the categories are necessary - not absolutely, but only 
for the sensible-experience they are intended to make intelligible."\1 
For the unity of experience Kant turns to the Synthesis ofApprehension in Intuition, 
Synthesis ofReproduction in Imagination, and the Synthesis ofRecognition in an Object. 
These are the three divisions of a single synthesis of the manifold of intuition. The 
IOHahn, Robert, "The Metaphysical Deduction" (Philosophy 468A handout) Southern 
Illinois University, 1998 
IIHahn, Robert, Kant's Newtonian Revolution in Philosophy (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press, 1988) p.1 I 1 
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Understanding's role is to actively bind our sensations into a unity. Kant's goal is to 
demonstrate that this synthesis is necessary and therefore an a priori assertion. In 
accomplishing this he is then able to affirm the necessity of the categories. 
The synthesis of apprehension is the act of running through and holding together or 
ordering and connecting specific impressions by means of a certain temporal sequencing, 
time being that most fundamental and formal condition of all inner sense. Each 
representation existing in one moment in time can be considered nothing less than a 
complete unity. The synthesis of apprehension is the manner in which these otherwise 
separate unities are linked together. "In order that unity may arise out of this manifold (as 
is required in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held 
together.,,12 
The synthesis of reproduction in imagination allows us to be aware of the fact that we 
are experiencing a succession of sensations. This synthesis enables us to recall or 
reproduce representations in our minds even after the object for which the intuition was 
given is no longer present. It also allows us to intuit an object of sense impression while 
at the same time reproducing earlier representations of that same object. "Experience 
necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances." 13 
The synthesis of recognition in an object is that activity through which we become 
aware that the object of our sensible intuitions is in fact the same object that we can 
reproduce in our imaginations. It allows us to identify an object based on previous 
representations and is therefore necessary for any knowledge of objects. "Without it 
[synthesis of recognition in an object], concepts, and therewith knowledge of objects, are 
altogether impossible." 14 
The reader of this essay may take the paper being read as an example. First, the 
representations must be bound together in some order. This allows the intuitor to have the 
experience of things happening in succession. Next, even while looking at the essay, the 
continuity of experience requires that you must be reproducing these earlier 
representations in your mind while reading on. The reader must also be able to recognize 
that the paper being read is one and the same paper as is being reproduced in the 
imagination. 
12Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.l31 
I3Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.133 
14Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.134 
~ 
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These syntheses take place simultaneously and spontaneously to produce the unity 
without which experience, as we have it, would be impossible. If experience were not 
bound up in such a unity then we would experience great shock from moment to moment, 
not being able to connect one to another, and knowledge of objects would be impossible. 
It is relevant to note that when Kant speaks of "an object of representations" he is 
speaking of some undetennined, unknowable object = x, outside of and yet also 
corresponding to our knowledge. Appearances are nothing more than representations and 
as such are not objects capable of existing outside our powers of representation. Our 
modes of knowledge, in order that they not be arbitrary or haphazard must necessarily 
relate to these objects. This relation is ensured by the unity which constitutes the concept 
of an object. However, since we deal only with representations and not with the object 
itself (being distinct from all our representations of it), the unity necessitated by the object 
must be the fonnal unity 04.consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of 
representations. "It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of 
intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object.,,15 
Once Kant believes himself to have established the necessity of the categories, he faces 
a new problem: how is it that the categories of understanding, while not derived from 
experience, may find application in experience? The categories, being pure concepts of 
understanding, can never be met within any intuition which is sensible and empirical in 
nature. However, concepts have no meaning if there is no object given for them. From 
this we see that the categories, as conditions of all possible experience, cannot be 
extended to objects in themselves, only our understanding of them. In fact, they cannot be 
applied to objects at all without questioning the manner in which those objects may be 
given to us. 
3. As they were given in the Transcendental Deduction, the categories provide the 
conditions which must be presupposed for the knowledge of objects in general. 
Schematizing the categories, however, allows us to refer to and identifY the specific 
contents of intuition. We already know that the categories must find some application in 
experience, because if they could not find such application, they could not make my 
experience comprehensible. Yet it must be possible that my experience is understandable 
because I actually understand it. The difficulty is to explain "how?" Now we must show 
15Kant, Critique a/Pure Reason, p.135 
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how this application of the a priori structures of thought to the a posteriori contents of 
intuition is possible. 
Kant determines that the only way to allow for the possibility of the categories to find 
referential application to intuitions is if there exists some third thing which acts as a 
liaison between the categorical world ofa priori categories and the empirical world ofa 
posteriori intuitions. This third thing is the transcendental determination oftime or the 
transcendental schema. Time is the formal a priori condition of all intuitions, both inner 
and outer. It is this a priori determination as the form of all intuitions that it shares with 
the categories. These a priori determinations of time relate to the categories as 
time-series, time-content, time-order and the scope of time. It is by schematizing the 
categories in determination with time that they are made relevant to the world of sensible 
intuitions. 
Schematas underlie pure sensible intuitions. They exist only in thought as the rules 
governing synthesis of imagination. Each specific image, after all, is limited in such a 
way that it can only be a special case of the concept and cannot possibly engender 
everything held within that concept. My concept of a dog, for instance, includes the 
possibility ofmany different figures offour-footed animals that range in color, 
personality, size, fur and a number ofother respects. An image of a Yellow Labrador 
Retriever, however, limits me only to one particular dog, yellow in color, about sixty 
pounds in size and in possession of other specific characteristics. In fact, that image 
cannot even be adequate to my concept of a Yellow Lab, since one can imagine a good 
deal of variation even within that one breed, which is not contained in that particular 
specimen. 
While there are twelve categories as pure concepts of the understanding, this number is 
reduced to eight when we schematize the categories. The categories ofQuantity (Unity, 
Plurality, Totality) all center on the idea of magnitude. Since the categories are 
schematized in determination with time this is understood as magnitude in time. 
Magnitude in time is focused on the idea of successiveness. It is something that becomes 
magnitude and ceases to be magnitude. Since the succession of time is arrived at by one 
moment following another, Kant reaches number as the schema of Quantity. 
The categories ofQuality (Reality, Negation, Limitation) all deal with the idea of 
existence. In order for anything to exist to us, it must exist in intuition and it must be an 
object of sense impression. Insofar as something exists as a sensation, it necessarily 
carries along with it a certain degree of intensity in addition to a magnitude. The heat 
m 
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which we perceive coming from a stove is more intense when that stove is turned on to 
400 degrees than when it is only turned to 150 degrees. That which does not exist is 
therefore necessarily without intensity (or magnitude). Moreover, the stove of the 
previous example must necessarily pass through every degree of intensity between 400 
degrees and 150 degrees when it is turned down to the lower temperature. This must be 
true to ensure the continuity of experience. 
The first category under Relation is that of Substance. Substance is not a mere 
collection of properties, but is that underlying element to which those properties adhere. It 
is that which is constant in a process of change. If there were nothing which remained 
unchanged within a substance, we would be dealing with separate and distinct objects and 
could no longer characterize what takes place as change. "If a piece ofwax is warmed, it 
goes through a series of changes, but continues to be the same piece of wax. Even if all its 
properties are changed, the piece of wax, of which these different properties are the 
properties, nonetheless remains one and the same piece ofwax. What continues to be the 
same are not the properties themselves but that of which they are the properties, namely 
the substratum."16 
The category ofCausality, second under Relation, is schematized by a succession of 
events such that each occurring state is conditioned by some previous state according to a 
rule and in turn it itself conditions the state which follows upon it, also according to a 
rule. 
Finally under Relation we find Community. The important element in the schematized 
category of Community is interaction. That in a disjunctive judgment like, "Either'A' 
has some property 'B' or 'c' has some property 'D'," any changes in 'A' have their cause 
in 'c' and likewise any changes in 'c' have their cause in 'A'. 
For Modality we start with Possibility-Impossibility. As a schematized category we are 
dealing with the question of empirical possibility. We are looking for that which satisfies 
the conditions ofexperience, i.e. conforms to our cognitive apparatus. We are not here 
concerned with logical possibility and the law of non-contradiction. Zeno for instance 
presents those paradoxes which are logically impossible and yet empirically possible. 
In the schematized category of Existence we are dealing only with that which is 
actually found to exist as an object of experience. An object ceases to be mere possibility 
16Hahn, Robert, "The Schematism" (Philosophy 468A handout) Southern l1linois 
University, 1998 
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and becomes actual only when it at some point is established experientially as an object 
ofone's intuition. 
The final schematized category is Necessity. That which belongs to this category is any 
thing which actually exists as an object of experience at all times, rather than at this or 
that particular time. 
4. In the Analogies of Experience Kant wishes to demonstrate that "experience is only 
possible through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.,,17The goal 
of the first analogy is the Principle ofPermanence ofSubstance. Every appearance is 
conditioned by time, and therefore only in time may succession or coexistence be 
represented. Time itself being an a priori condition cannot be perceived, so the 
substratum representing time in general must be found in the objects of perception. The 
object itself is, then, that which is permanent in appearances and that which changes is 
only a determination of that object. "All existence and all change in time have thus to be 
viewed as simply a mode of the existence ofthat which remains and persists." 18 A 
"mere" succession of perceptions does not therefore qualifY as an event. An event must be 
interpreted as a change in the object. This is necessary to give the determination of 
time-relations an objective order. It is important that we realize the distinction between 
changes in an object and mere succession of perceptions. This distinction is necessary to 
draw upon in the Second Analogy and is the only way to differentiate between subjective 
and objective temporal relations on which the unity of experience depends. 
In the Second Analogy Kant asserts that "All alterations take place in conformity with 
the law of the connection of cause and effect." I9He observes that appearances follow one 
another sequentially in such a manner that at one point in time there may be a certain 
predicate attached to a subject and at some other point the opposite predicate may be 
attached to that same subject. Since he has stated in the First Analogy that time cannot in 
itself be perceived, it follows that the ordering of events in time, one state of things 
occurring at an earlier or later point in time than another state, cannot be empirically 
determined by relation to it. Nor is the objective relation of appearances following upon 
one another to be determined through the mere order of our perceptions. Again, there 
must be some criteria which is both objective and empirical in order that we can 
17Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.208 
18Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.2 I4 
19Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.2l8 
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distinguish between objective and subjective temporal relations. Kant gives as an 
illustration the example of a house. We might just as easily look at the house from left 
first and then to right as the opposite. Just because I perceive one side of the house before 
I perceive the other does not mean the left side is caused by the right. That is an example 
of mere order of perceptions and does not imply causality. However, his example of a 
boat moving downstream is an example of an objective succession. We must first see the 
boat up stream and following that we see the boat downstream. In this way he arrives at a 
necessary order of our perceptions as an adequate basis for time-order. It is empirical 
because it finds expression in our perceptual experience and it is objective because it 
allows us to distinguish between a "perception of succession" and a "succession of 
perceptions." We cannot ascribe this succession to an object except when there is some 
underlying rule that forces us to observe the order of perceptions in the particular way that 
we do, and not any other order. Hence if the order of perceptions is necessary, then the 
order of change in the object perceived is causally determined, and the very experience in 
which we observe these concepts is itself only possible through their existence; causal 
determination is a necessary condition of experience. "Our experience must be 
conceptualized in accordance with the category of causality if our experience is to be of 
objects ordered in time.,,20 
E. Transcendental Dialectic 
So far, Kant has written nearly three hundred pages of his Critique ofPure Reason and 
has yet to even mention the faculty of Reason outside of the Preface! What he has done 
up to this point is present the new project of metaphysics as he sees it and layout the 
foundation for its critical structure. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant proposes that empirical intuitions must conform 
to the formal conditions of our understanding, namely space and time. In the Analytic he 
focuses on how it is that we may have theoretical knowledge under these conditions and 
what the limits of such knowledge are. These two sections, taken together, are Kant's 
critical system of epistemology. The understanding synthesizes pure intuitions and 
concepts with empirical intuitions, in accordance with the categories to arrive at 
20Hahn, Robert, "Second Analogy" (Philosophy 468a handout) Southern Illinois 
University, 1998 
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theoretical knowledge. However, when reason places demands upon the understanding by 
asking questions for which no sensible intuition is given, the categories are extended 
beyond their possible application and only illusion can follow. This is the problem that 
Kant takes up in the Transcendental Dialectic. 
Reason is the faculty of inference, or that faculty which draws conclusions from 
premises. Since there are three kinds of conclusions in a syllogism, categorical, 
hypothetical and disjunctive, there are three types of illusions of reason or pseudo-rational 
inferences, Paralogisms (categorical), Antinomies (hypothetical) and the Ideal ofPure 
Reason (disjunctive). 
I. The Paralogisms attack rational psychology in the form of Descartes' famous Cogito 
ergo sum (I think therefore I am). Descartes' theory of perception holds that things do 
actually exist that are external to us, though his method ofdoubting initially dismisses 
external objects. These external things cause us to have certain perceptions and these 
perceptions in tum imply their existence. This is a causal theory of perception. 
A "person" here is considered to be a substance, the thinking thing (res cogitans). This 
existence as a thinking thing is ensured for Descartes through his process of doubting. 
Thinking things, however, are non-spacial entities and therefore different from extended 
things (res extensa). There is ample justification in Descartes' mind to separate the soul 
from the body and release it from the bounds of death and mortality. 
A paralogism is an invalid or fallacious syllogism. Kant believes the fallacy in 
Descartes work to be in his use of the concept of "substance." Descartes held himself to 
have come to the conclusions that the soul is a simple unitary substance which is in 
relation to possible objects in space, and that this showed the soul to be the immaterial, 
incorruptible principle oflife in animals. 
The syllogistic fallacy committed here is of the fourth term (quaternio terminorem), 
since the same word "self' or "substance" has two different meanings, but only the 
critical philosophy reveals it. Kant calls this type offallacy a sophismajigurae dictionis, 
which is a fallacy where what appears to be the middle term is used differently in the 
major and minor premise. This difference in use, Kant claims, creates a new, fourth, term 
which can only be identified by his transcendental philosophy. 
The mistake lies in thinking that I can be conscious of my existence separate from the 
empirical conditions of experience and even from experience itself. This confuses the 
possible abstraction from an empirically determined existence with some sort of 
knowledge of a possible existence of a thinking self, separate from such empirical 
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detenninations. This leads one to the erroneous conclusion that we may have knowledge 
of what is substantial in us as a transcendental subject, that is as a thing-in-itself. 
Instead, Kant maintains that the self is not a substance at all, as an object of theoretical 
knowledge, but rather an activity of synthesis. This subject of 'I think' is nothing more 
than the unity of consciousness. Beyond this we can have no theoretical knowledge of a 
soul because to attempt to have such knowledge requires that we extend the categories of 
intuition to something which is not an object of any possible sense experience, and is thus 
the improper employment of the Understanding. 
2. The Antinomies are designed to illustrate the two primary theses of Transcendental 
Idealism, in contrast to the principles of the rationalists (represented by the theses) and 
the empiricists (represented by the antitheses). These are noumenalism and 
phenomenalism. These theses deal with things in themselves as opposed to things as they 
appear. Things in themselves are not spacio-temporally detennined and are not objects of 
our experience as sensible intuitors. Things as they appear are the spacio-temporal objects 
of experience, but are only collections of representations. 
The first two antinomies, or mathematical antinomies, demonstrate Kant's 
transcendental idealism in tenns of phenomenalism. 
In the first antinomy the thesis states that, "The world has a beginning in time, and is 
also limited as regards space," and the antithesis states, "The world has no beginning, and 
no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space.,,21 Each side argues by 
first assuming the truth of its opposition, and then showing the resulting state of events to 
be absurd; that is, each argues indirectly by a reductio proof. 
The thesis argues that if there was no beginning in time then each moment would have 
to be the culmination of an infinite series of temporal units, since each moment in time 
follows upon another and is in turn followed upon by the next moment. However, an 
infinite series by definition cannot ever be completed. Therefore, the world must have had 
some beginning in time. 
The antithesis argues that if the world were to have a beginning in time it would mean 
that preceding that beginning, there was a time in which there was nothing- an empty 
time. However, nothing can arise from an empty time because this time has no 
characteristic in it which would provide sufficient cause for a thing to come into being at 
21 Kant, Critique ojPure Reason, p.396 
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that particular time as opposed to any other- ex nihilo nihil fit. Therefore, the world has 
no beginning in time. 
As regards space, the thesis argues that if the world were not limited in space, it would 
require the completion of a successive synthesis ofpoints, which would require an 
infinite amount of time to complete. Again, since an infinite series, by definition, can 
never be complete, the notion of the world as infinite in space is absurd. Therefore, the 
world must be within a finite degree of space. 
The antithesis argues that if the world were finite in space it would then exist in an 
infinite amount of empty space. If this were true then the world would not only relate to 
objects in space but also to space itself. Yet such a relation is impossible in empty space 
because you relate the world, an absolute whole beyond which there is no intuition, to 
nothing; no object. Therefore the world is infinite and unlimited as regards extension in 
space. 
The second antinomy asserts in the thesis that, "Every composite substance in the 
world is made up of simple parts, and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is 
composed of the simple," while the antithesis contends that, "No composite thing in the 
world is made up of simple parts, and there nowhere exists in the world anything simple." 
The thesis argues by assuming that there are not any simple indivisible parts ofwhich 
composites were made. Substances would then be infinitely divisible until there exists 
nothing, like sand through one's fingers. Out of nothing, nothing may come, therefore 
there must exist simple parts of which all composites are made. 
The antithesis holds that if there were simple parts ofwhich composites were made, 
these parts must either be divisible or indivisible. If they are divisible, then they cannot, 
by definition, be simple. If they are not divisible, they must further be classified as 
extended or unextended. If they are not extended, then they are nothing, yet this is not 
possible since out of nothing, nothing comes. If they are extended, then they are by 
definition not indivisible and hence not simple. Therefore, there is no simple indivisible 
substance ofwhich all composites are made. 
Kant holds that these apparently contradictory statements (statements which always 
have the opposite truth value) are actually only contraries (statements which cannot both 
be true, but can both be false). He believes that there is a legitimate discrepancy which 
must be resolved and contends that the resolution lies not in the logic (as with the 
paralogisms), but in a false premise upon which both sides rest. This premise is that the 
world exists as a whole, in itself, completely independent of any sense perceptions. 
~ 
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What follows upon this recognition is that, if the world exists as a totality, independent 
ofour perceptions, then it is both finite and infinite as regards space and time, and it is 
both finitely and infinitely divisible. These are self-contradictory statements and are, 
consequently, both false. It is in this way that the first two antinomies provide an indirect 
proof ofTranscendental Idealism's phenomenalistic assertions. 
The dynamical third and fourth antinomies are to provide Transcendental Idealism's 
noumenalistic assertions. The third antinomy states in the thesis that, "Causality in 
accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of 
the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to 
assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom." The antithesis states, "There 
is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of 
nature.,,22 
Kant believes he has established the antithesis in the Second Analogy of the 
Transcendental Analytic, where he proves that "All alterations take place in conformity 
with the law of the connection of cause and effect.,,23 The antithesis proceeds by arguing 
that transcendental freedom stands in direct conflict with the law of causality. If freedom 
exists, as the thesis maintains, then causality itself will have an absolute beginning, and 
that absolute beginning is the spontaneous act which set the causal series into effect. This 
beginning has no antecedent through which this act is determined according to fixed laws. 
Any beginning assumes this state of a not yet acting cause, and any dynamical beginning 
presupposes a state that does not follow from its preceding state and therefore has no 
causal connection to it. This is clearly in violation with the law of cause and effect. 
Moreover, if there is no law of the connection between cause and effect, the unity of 
experience is no longer possible. There can be no law of freedom to take its place either, 
because freedom, by its nature, cannot be determined in accordance with laws. 
The thesis proceeds by arguing that if there is no law other than causality, as is 
maintained in the antithesis, each state ofappearances is an effect ofa previous state. 
That causal state, in turn, is then necessarily itself an effect of an even earlier state. For 
this to be the true state of events the series would go on ad infinitum and there would 
never be any first cause or absolute beginning by which the series could be complete. But 
for anything to take place within the law of causality, there must be a previous state that 
22Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.409 
23Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.2 I8 
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can be determined a priori to be sufficient to bring about some other state.24 Therefore, 
the law of cause and effect, when taken universally, is self-contradictory, and this 
necessitates the idea of causality through freedom, the absolute spontaneity of a cause 
which follows upon natural laws, but does not arise out of them. 
The transcendental analytic proved the truth of the antithesis, and Kant is unwilling to 
compromise on this point. Kant's Copernican tum showed that insofar as I have 
experience of anything as real, space and time are the basic conditions that characterize 
that experience; but they are not conditions of things in themselves (i.e., of noumena). 
The third antinomy arises when metaphysicians extend the forms of space and time to the 
conditions of things in themselves. This leads them to the conclusion that they are able to 
make judgments about those things-such as the absolute beginning of a series, the 
unconditioned condition-for which there will never be any sense impression. As a result 
they apply the categories to non-sensuous intuitions. This is an inappropriate demand of 
the understanding, and never results in theoretical knowledge.25 
The thesis in the fourth antinomy declares, "There belongs to the world, either as its 
part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary," and in the antithesis, "An 
absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world 
as its cause." 
The antithesis here asserts two possibilities if such an absolute being does, in fact, 
exist as part of the world: either there is a beginning in the series which is absolutely 
necessary or the series itself is without any beginning and, though conditioned in all its 
parts, is absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a whole. The first possibility is 
impossible because it is in conflict with the law governing the determination of 
appearances in time (discussed in the first antinomy) and the second is self-contradictory, 
since the existence of a series could not be necessary unless at least one of its parts were 
necessary. 
If it is assumed by the antithesis that there exists some being as an absolutely necessary 
cause of the world, but existing outside of it, this being would need to begin to act to set 
24Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, pAlO
 
25Hergott and Shargell, "How does Kant's 'Copernican tum' solve the third antinomy?"
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the wheels of causality rolling. However, the causality of that act would have to exist in 
time, and would therefore belong to the world, and is therefore self-contradictory. 
The thesis maintains, on the other hand, that in the world there are contained a number 
of alterations. These alterations are conditioned by time and causality and each, under its 
conditions is thereby necessary. Each given condition implies an unbroken series of 
conditions all the way back to the unconditioned cause, which alone is unconditionally or 
absolutely necessary. Thus since alterations are effects of an absolutely necessary 
existence, and we experience such effects, that existence must be posited. Further, this 
being must belong to the sensible world because if this was not the case, then the highest 
condition of all alterations would derive its cause from something not belonging to the 
world. This is impossible, since the beginning of a temporal series can only be derived 
from that which precedes it in time. 
Kant believes that the third and fourth antinomies demonstrates that the antitheses and 
the theses are not in themselves mutually exclusive. Rather, Kant has left open the 
possibility that the thesis in each of these may also be true. He contends that in the 
dynamical antinomies, no actual contradiction exists. This is the noumenal aspect of 
Transcendental Idealism which will be discussed further in Chapter Two. 
3. The Transcendental Ideal of Pure Reason is to attain and comprehend the idea of a 
supreme being, God. This is the pseudo-rational pursuit of theology. 
This idea of God is of a being which must, by it's supposed nature, exist independently 
of the conditions for the possibility of experience. It is responsible for the ultimate reality 
upon which all things depend, therefore it is considered to exist independently of our 
existence. Furthennore, God is a being whose existence cannot even be thought of in 
tenns suggested by experience. Clearly, God as an object is well outside of the realm of 
any possible sensuous intuition, and therefore transcends the application of the categories 
of understanding. 
Kant insists on Transcendental Idealism, a metaphysical theory that affinns the 
unkowability of things in themselves and, therefore, relegates knowledge to the purely 
subjective realm of appearances.26He insists that appearances are representations only 
and that time and space are strictly fonns of our sensible intuition and are not to be 
considered as things existing in themselves or as conditions of external objects as things 
26AlIison, Henry, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1983) p.3 
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in themselves.27 We must then deny any possible theoretical knowledge of the existence 
or nature of God as illusory. 
II. The Possibility of Practical Knowledge in the Critique ofPure
 
Reason
 
A. Freedom (Third Antinomy) 
In the third Antinomy Kant introduces the possibility of transcendental freedom. The 
thesis states that "Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality 
from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these 
appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of 
freedom."28 This particular statement is denied by Kant who refers back to the second 
analogy in the transcendental analytic which asserts the necessity that "all alterations take 
place in conformity within the law of the connection of cause and effect,"29 as a 
condition for the possibility of the unity of experience into one consciousness. 
It is specific elements of the thesis, however, that he disagrees with and finds 
unacceptable, not the concept of transcendental freedom itself. In particular, the thesis is 
attempting to show that the appearances of the world may be derived from some free 
causality. Kant insists, that anything belonging to the phenomenal world, the world of 
experience, must be viewed as a state which is conditioned by some previous state and is, 
in tum, itself conditioning the following state. 
This distinction between phenomena (things as they appear) and noumena 
(things-in-themselves) is extremely significant for Kant in his resolution to the third 
antinomy. It is this very distinction that allows for the possibility of freedom when events 
that are subject to causal determination, if viewed solely as phenomena, are viewed, 
instead, as noumena. In this latter instance, it is possible for the noumenal events to 
manifest free causality. 
27Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.345 
28Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.409 
29Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.2l8 
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The mere possibility that we may think of noumenal objects as having free causality, or 
having any predicate for that matter, is very different from having knowledge of these 
things. In fact, it is impossible to have theoretical knowledge of noumenal objects 
because they are not objects of possible experience. Nevertheless, Kant believes we may 
make certain claims about noumenal objects providing that we are given sufficient reason 
to do so. These claims would not be in conflict with any valid claims to theoretical 
knowledge, and could not be contradicted by any such claims, since they lie beyond all 
possible limits of theoretical knowledge. "Therefore while transcendental idealism insists 
that there can be no knowledge of any noumenal entities, it does so in a way that creates 
room for the thought of such entities and guarantees that propositions about them are not 
inconsistent with theoretical knowledge.,,30 
Kant has here placed his foot firmly in the door leaving open the possibility that 
transcendental freedom may exist. It is discovered when the category of causality is 
applied to noumena, which can never yield theoretical knowledge, but may however yield 
a different kind of knowledge: practical knowledge. However, the assertion that viewing 
certain events as a determined by some sort of noumenal free causality is not inconsistent 
with the world view of transcendental idealism falls far short of giving us positive 
warrant within that system for doing so. 
B. Soul ( Paralogisms), God (Idea/Ideal) 
The possibility for the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are important 
to mention here because they are later posited as postulates of pure practical reason. The 
difficulty in discussing them within the context of the Critique ofPure Reason, however, 
rests in the fact that the Paralogisms seem to suggest that there is no soul. While the 
existence of God is then considered to be possible, but unprovable from the perspective 
of theoretical knowledge (Fourth Antinomy, Idea/Ideal), when Kant finally asserts its 
reality, it is as the second postulate of pure practical reason, and the argument relies on 
the existence of the soul. 
C. What Ought I to do in the Transcendental Doctrine of Methods? 
30Reath, Andrews, Introduction to the Critique ofPractical Reason (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.xii 
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In the Transcendental Doctrine of Reason, Kant makes more clear his argument for 
practical knowledge. It is here, in the Canon of Pure Reason, that he explains more 
thoroughly what it is and why it is necessary. 
He believes himself to have exhausted the possibilities for theoretical knowledge, and 
found nowhere in it the answers to those questions that reason insists upon asking. 
Unsatisfied that the answers just don't exist, he turns from the merely speculative 
employment of reason to the only other path remaining, namely, its practical 
employment. 
First Kant wishes to remind the reader of the ultimate end of the employment of reason 
at all. This end concerns primarily three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality 
of the soul, and the existence of God. In the name of speculative reason alone, we should 
not have bothered to undertake the transcendental investigation since, in respect of 
reasons theoretical employment we should not be able to make much use of any 
discoveries in these matters. Even if the will is free, we must still regard our actions as 
phenomenally determined in accordance with the law of causal connection. Even if there 
exists some immortal soul, we would not be able to explain in theoretical terms the 
appearance of our present life or the nature of any future one. Even if God exists, we 
would still not be able to figure out thereby the ordering or disposition of the world in any 
particular, specific terms. These three objects of the ultimate ends of reason are ironically 
transcendent of any theoretical employment of it. We cannot have any theoretical 
knowledge of them, and so if reason has any interest in these propositions at all, which 
experience strongly suggests it does, it must be only a practical interest. 
'The Practical' Kant defines as everything that is possible through freedom. Therefore 
to speak of the practical, one must first posit the existence of freedom, which we have no 
speculative grounds for doing. In this sense, reason's business is to determine all of our 
possible actions in respect of the one single end ofattaining happiness. The laws that 
reason may determine in this field are practical or pragmatic, but reason cannot hope to 
supply laws that are pure and completely determined a priori. Such laws are moral laws, 
and these are what belong to the practical employment of reason. The question 
concerning us as far as we may be concerned with moral laws is, "If the will is free, what 
ought I to do?" or "What reason have I for choosing anyone course of action over 
another?" 
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It is in this practical sense that Kant now wishes to speak of freedom. Namely in the 
sense that we appear to have the ability and even a necessity to make decisions 
consistently throughout the course of our lives. In choosing one course of action over 
another we employ a will. "A will which can be determined independently of sensuous 
impulses, and therefore through motives which are represented only by reason, is entitled 
freewill (arbitrium liberum), and everything which is bound up with this will, whether as 
ground or as consequence, is entitiedpractical."31Experience affirms this will in that we 
are able to overcome that which immediately acts upon our senses and conjure 
representations of that which is desirable in respect to our whole state. Since it is reason 
which provides these representations, one may accurately say that reason provides 
imperatives or objective laws offreedom which prescribe to us what ought to happen, 
although perhaps it never does, as opposed to laws ofnature which simply relate to us 
that which happens. For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it 
must be possible for them to take place. The laws of freedom are therefore practical laws. 
Whether reason itself is determined in respect of still other influences or whether that 
which we here entitle freedom is not actually, in relation to higher and more remote 
causes, just nature again does not concern us here in our present enterprise. Those are 
questions of theoretical knowledge, speculative questions, which can be left aside for the 
time being. Practical freedom itself is a cause in nature, that of reason in the 
determination of the will. Transcendental freedom, however, is contrary to the law of 
nature and so continues to remain a problem. There are now two questions remaining for 
the in the canon: Is there a God? and, Is there a future life? 
Kant believes that pure reason, in attempting to escort us to ideas which reach to these 
ends must be met with in the practical sphere. It is from this standpoint of its practical 
interests that perhaps it can supply us with the answers it altogether refuses to supply in 
respect of its speculative interests. All of these interests of reason can be combined into 
three questions: 1.)What can I know? 2.) What ought I to do? 3.) What may I hope? 
Kant modestly believes that he has exhausted the possibilities of speculative reason, at 
least in form, and thereby answered the first question. He therefore moves on to the next 
two. 
3IKant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.633 
~ 
30 
Happiness is the singular satisfaction of all our desires. This provides his answer to the 
first of the remaining two questions of pure reason that concern its practical interest: Do 
that through which thou becomest worthy to be happy.32 
In regards to the last question, Kant maintains that just as the moral principles are 
necessary according to reason in its practical employment, it is necessary for its 
theoretical employment to assume that everyone has ground to hope for happiness in the 
measure in which he has rendered himself by his conduct worthy of it. 
The system ofmorality is therefore inseparably bound up with that of happiness. Such 
an idea, however, of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out ofwhich 
rests on the condition that every single person in that system does what he ought. All 
participating beings act rationally and make decisions in accordance with the moral law, 
just as they should. This supposed necessity of the connection between the hope of 
happiness with the endeavor to render oneself worthy of such happiness cannot be known 
through reason alone. It is only in the ideal of some supreme original good that reason 
finds the grounds for this connection. 
This is the grounds simultaneously for a moral world. Since we are constrained by 
reason to represent ourselves as belonging to such a world, and since the senses present 
us with nothing but the world of appearances, we are forced to assume that the moral 
world is a consequence ofour conduct in the world of sense. However no such 
connection between worthiness and happiness is there exhibited. Therefore, we must 
posit the existence of a future world. "Thus God and a future life are two postulates 
which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation 
which that same reason imposes upon us."33 
Reason must assume this future life, together with a wise Ruler, in order to salvage 
moral laws as being anything other than empty figments of the brain. It is this connection 
that causes people to view moral laws as commands which connect a priori certain 
consequences to rules, thus creating a system ofpromises and threats. 
It is therefore a person's moral disposition which conditions and makes possible that 
person's participation in happiness, the ultimate end of all desires. It is not, however, the 
prospect of happiness that makes possible the moral disposition. 
32Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.638 
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Kant believes that a theology of this kind is advantageous to traditional theologies. His 
justification of this, however, is the reason why he was politely asked not to teach 
theology: "Neither in transcendental nor in natural theology, however far reason may 
carry us, do we find any considerable ground for assuming only some one single being 
which we should be justified in placing prior to all natural causes, and upon which we 
might make them in all respects dependent.,,34 
It is believed here by Kant that he has shown that pure reason, though only in its 
practical employment, has finally connected with its ultimate ends, namely the concept of 
a sole primordial being as the supreme good. This concept is not something which can be 
established or demonstrated, but can be thought only, and must be thought of as a 
postulate which is absolutely necessary, given the ultimate interests of reason. 
There is a third and final section of the canon of pure reason, Opining, Knowing, and 
Believing, in which Kant attempts to draw a distinction between the three. To hold an 
opinion is to hold a judgment which is consciously insufficient, not only objectively, but 
subjectively as well. If one holds a judgment which is subjectively sufficient and yet takes 
it to be objectively sufficient as well, this is believing. We may be said to know 
something, however, only when we hold a judgment which is sufficiently shown to be 
true both subjectively and objectively. 
Kant is trying here to demonstrate why his holdings about theology are not merely his 
beliefs, but it is somehow required that everyone hold these beliefs. He claims that once 
an end is accepted, the conditions for attaining it must also be, at least hypothetically, 
necessary. This necessity is only subjectively sufficient ifhe knows of no other way to 
attain this end. The necessity is absolutely sufficient, however, ifhe knows that under no 
possible conditions can anyone else have knowledge of another means for attaining that 
end. It is the difference between a merely contingent belief and a necessary belief. 
There are some instances where contingent belief is enough. This is illustrated in the 
first Critique by the example of a doctor who, upon examining a patient in danger, can 
find no certain diagnosis, but believes it to be a case of phthisis. A contingent beliefof 
this kind, which is yet used as the ground for the actual employment of means to certain 
actions is called pragmatic belief. The value or degree of this belief is found through 
betting, and this seems to be precisely what Kant thinks we are doing each time we 
34Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.641 
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exercise our wills. "Sometimes it turns out that [one1has a conviction which can be 
estimated at a value ofone ducat, but not of ten. For [one1is very willing to venture one 
ducat, but when it is a question often he becomes aware, as he had not previously been, 
that it may very well be that he is in error. Ifwe represent ourselves as staking the 
happiness of our whole life, the triumphant tone ofour judgment is greatly abated."35 
The judgments with which practical knowledge concerns itself are of a specific type 
that there is no existing means of arriving at certainty in these matters. We may entitle 
beliefs of this kind to be doctrinal beliefs. Any doctrine ofthe existence ofGod is 
precisely this sort of doctrinal belief. Kant is able to make this assertion, however, 
because he knows ofno other condition under which he may be guided in the 
investigation of nature except if there is some supreme intelligence which has ordered 
everything according to the wisest ends. Therefore, this belief is not strictly practical, but 
doctrinal, as is the belief in the future life of the human soul. He is here required not to 
assume the concepts of a God or future life, but only the existence of such. 
1 feel compelled before going on to give one more example of such a doctrinal belief 
held by Kant: "I should be ready to stake my all on the contention - were it possible by 
means of any experience to settle the question - that at least one of the planets which we 
see is inhabited. Hence 1say that it is not merely opinion, but a strong belief, on the 
correctness ofwhich 1should be prepared to run great risks, that other worlds are 
inhabited.,,36 Make of this what you will. 
Moral belief is something quite different. It is a necessary belief and requires 
necessarily that 1 must conform to the moral law. The end is clearly established and 
accepted and there is only one possible condition under which this end can have practical 
validity by connecting with all other ends: that there be a God and a future world. For 
Kant there is also a complete certainty that no other person may have any knowledge of 
some other conditions which would lead to the same unity of ends under the moral law. 
From this he derives his belief in a God and future life, this conviction being not logical, 
but moral. While no one can assert that he knows there is a God and future life, at least no 
one may pretend that there is any certainty that there is no such being and no such life. 
Kant, however, is so certain that he states, "Nothing can shake this belief, since my moral 
principles would thereby be themselves overthrown, and 1cannot disclaim them without 
35Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.648 
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becoming abhorrent in my own eyes.,,37 Further, to Kant, the only point that may even 
seem questionable is the basing of this rational belief on the assumption ofmoral 
sentiments. 
III. The Possibility of Practical Knowledge in the Critique ofPractical 
Reason 
A. Freedom 
"Freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other.,,38 However 
it is only through consciousness of the moral law that we may become conscious of our 
freedom. In order to establish the existence of freedom, Kant must first establish the 
moral law. The question here becomes, "Does reason, by itself, provide grounds sufficient 
to determine the will?" and it becomes "Incumbent upon the Critique ofPractical Reason 
to prevent empirically conditioned reason from presuming that it, alone and exclusively, 
furnishes the determining ground of the will."39 To answer this question it is sufficient to 
show that reason by itself and free of empirical determinations can generate principles to 
serve as practical laws. 
Kant defines practical principles as those propositions that motivate one to act. A 
maxim is any such principle or rule of conduct. When the conditions for action are 
regarded as holding only for one's own will, the principles involved are subjective. If, 
however, the conditions may be regarded as holding for the will of all rational beings, the 
principles are more than just subjective maxims, they are objective or practical laws. 
Any practical principles which presuppose some matter or object of desire as the 
determining ground of the will are mere maxims. They are all empirically determined and 
37Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.650 
38Kant, Immanuel, Critique ofPractical Reason, trans. by Mary Gregor (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997) p.26 
39Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, p.12 
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can not yield objective practical laws. The determining ground of the will is the reason or 
principle on which one acts. It is impossible to determine whether a person has reason to 
act on a principle of this sort without having empirical information about that person's 
individual desires and circumstances. The validity ofa practical law, however, must be 
grounded in the basic and universal features of reason. They cannot be dependent on 
conditions and features which distinguish one individual from another. 
Further, all material principles of this sort may be categorized under a general principle 
of self-love or concern for one's own happiness. "What Kant does here is to make explicit 
a structural feature shared by material principles. In acting on such a principle, one takes 
the fact that the object offers prospective satisfaction as a reason for acting, and one 
decides how to act by asking how much satisfaction it offers."40 The satisfaction of 
desire-based interests is favorable, but only when certain moral conditions are met. 
We come upon practical laws only when we abstract the matter of a principle as a 
potential reason for action and we are left with its form. Thus, only if a principle is able to 
determine the will in virtue of its form alone, may it properly be called a practical law. 
Whether a principle has the form of law determines whether there is sufficient reason to 
act on it, and if a principle does not have the form of law there is sufficient reason to 
refrain from acting on it. The form of law is determined by whether one is able to 
universalize a given principle for action and still maintain that the action is 
commendable. If this principle for action has the form oflaw, the action in question thus 
becomes not only permissible, but a moral obligation. Such a system holds that there are 
moral absolutes and that one discovers what they are by determining whether a principle 
or rule for action has a universalized form of law. 
The mere form of a law, void of any substance, is not an object of sensible intuition; it 
can be represented by reason alone. It, therefore, does not belong with the world of 
appearances. The representation of the form oflaw as the determining ground of the will 
is, therefore, distinct from all empirically determined events which conform to the natural 
law of the connection of cause and effect. Such events must themselves be determined by 
appearances. However, if no determining ground other than a principle's form can serve 
as law, such a will is independent of the natural law governing appearances and their 
relationships to one another, the law of causality. This independence is transcendental 
40Reath, Introduction to the Critique ofPractical Reason, p.xxi 
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freedom. All actions following from the principle ofone's own happiness, where one acts 
in accordance with one's desire-based interests, are ultimately traceable to the empirical 
conditions that produced those desires. If one is able to act on a principle which 
determines whether a maxim has the form oflaw, regardless of the content, object, or 
matter of the action, one can act independently of empirical conditions, and thus 
conforms to the definitions of transcendental freedom. 
This will is free from the causal chain, but is not free to do whatever it pleases. It is 
only free to act in accordance with the moral law. Even a free will must act on some sort 
of principle. Otherwise it would display simply random, arbitrary acts which can hardly 
be described as volitional. "A free will, as independent of empirical conditions, must 
nevertheless be determinable."41 The principle on which a free will acts is that of taking 
the prescriptive form of a practical law as sufficient reason for action. 
We thus come to the Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason, the Categorical 
Imperative: "So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a 
principle in a giving ofuniversallaw.'>42 We are directly aware of this moral law and its 
authority rest in the fact that it is rooted in ordinary thought and experience. Kant calls 
this a fact of reason. The fact that there are practical laws shows that reason can indeed 
provide sufficient determining grounds for the will without submitting to any authority 
external to it. Moreover, we know that we can act in accordance with the moral law 
simply because we have a feeling that we ought to. 
As a matter of moral blameworthiness, however, Kant must make it clear that this 
capacity to act independently of empirical conditions underlies every action. Even ifwe 
do not choose to act morally, we could have; we had the freedom to act in accordance 
with the moral law. This ability to act in accordance with moral law must be omnipresent, 
otherwise there would be a need for some way to account for when and why we are able 
to exercise free, non-empirically determined, volition in some instances, but not in others. 
We exercise freedom with every decision. If this were not the case, we would only be 
responsible for those actions which conform to the moral law and could not be held 
responsible for acts based on our own interests or non-moral motives. 
41 Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, p.26 
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Kant's demonstration of transcendental freedom affords it "objective and, though only 
practical, undoubted reality."43 Yet he insists that it does not extend our theoretical 
knowledge. In order to do this he must find a rational basis his claim that is somehow 
different than the basis used for knowledge claims. The rational grounds that he claims 
are that freedom is revealed and proved by the law of practical reason. But since moral 
consciousness is not a spacio-temporal intuition, it has no theoretical basis, and is 
therefore fundamentally different than that sort of knowledge claim. 
Moral law and freedom therefore do imply each other, but it is only through our 
recognition of moral consciousness that we may also become aware of freedom. 
"Morality first discloses to us the concept of freedom. One would never have ventured to 
introduce freedom into science had not the moral law, and with it practical reason, come 
in and forced this concept upon us.,,44 Thus, "the moral law is the basic principle [of pure 
practical reason], and transcendental freedom is the kind of causality exercised by agents 
whim it can motivate."45 
B. Antinomy 
The Antinomy ofPractical Reason investigates the difficulty of the highest good 
(summum bonum). There are two subordinate parts of the highest good, the supreme 
good (bonum supremum) and the complete good (bonum consummatum). The supreme 
good is morality while the complete good is happiness. In the highest good which is 
practical for us, virtue and happiness are thought of as necessarily combined. 
This relationship must either be analytic or synthetic. If it were analytic, the two would 
reciprocally imply each other. However, since it has been everyone's experience to know 
people who are happy, but not virtuous, and virtuous, but not happy, Kant eliminates the 
possibility of the relation being analytic. It must be synthetic. Since it is a synthetic 
relation and it concerns a practical good, or one brought about through action, happiness 
and virtue must also be thought of as connected by cause and effect. Therefore, either the 
desire for happiness causes virtue or moral maxims having the form of law are the causes 
of happiness. 
43Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, p.43 
44Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, p.27 
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Maxims which put the determining ground of the will in the desire for one's own 
happiness can not be moral. They are empirically conditioned, and thus simply take place 
within the natural law of the connection of cause and effect. Therefore, the first 
possibility is impossible. However, virtue cannot be the cause of happiness, either. "Any 
practical connection of causes and effects in the world, as a result of the determination of 
the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the will but upon knowledge of 
the laws of nature and the physical ability to use them for one's purposes."46 It follows 
that no necessary connection of happiness with virtue in the world can be expected. 
The resolution to this antinomy, similar to the third and fourth antinomies from the 
Critique of Pure Reason, rests in the distinction between phenomena and noumena. While 
the first proposition, that the desire for happiness can cause a determining ground for 
moral disposition is absolutely false. That a virtuous disposition necessarily produces 
happiness, however, is only conditionally false. It is false if the only existence of a 
rational being is existence in the sensible world. Since we are justified in considering our 
existence also as noumena, it is possible, even necessary that there be a connection 
between morality of disposition and happiness. Acting in accordance with the moral law 
provides us with a purely intellectual determining ground of causality in the sensible 
world. "The supreme good (as the first condition of the highest good) is morality, whereas 
happiness constitutes its second element but in such a way that it is only the morally 
conditioned yet necessary result of the former.,,47 
Kant believes himself to have proven that there must be a connection between the 
consciousness ofmorality and the expectation of happiness in proportion to it. However, 
the problem still exists that happiness simply does not appear to be divvied out in 
proportion to virtue in the world. Thus he proposes the existence of a soul, so that you 
can be certain you will be around long enough to receive the happiness you deserve, and 
the existence of God as the moral author of the universe devising the natural laws in just 
such a way as is appropriate to ensure that happiness is granted in proportion to virtue. 
These are the two postulates of practical reason. 
C. Soul (Immortality) 
46Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, p.95 
47Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, p.l 00 
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A will determined in accordance with the moral law is necessarily interested in the 
production of the highest good in the world. The condition of the highest good, however, 
is complete conformity to the moral law, which is a level of perfection unattainable in 
rational beings ofthe sensible world, or holiness. Since the highest good must remain the 
goal of a moralistically determined will, it is necessary to assume endless progress toward 
such conformity as the real object of our will. 
Endless progress is possible only through endless existence. The highest good is 
therefore only possible ifwe assume the immortality ofthe soul. This immortality is thus 
termed a postulate of pure practical reason. It is a necessary condition of the practical 
possibility of the highest good, and for that reason is bound up with the moral law. 
D.God 
As moral and rational beings we have a responsibility to do all that we can to bring 
about the highest good in the world. While the possibility of the highest good is 
consistent with the laws of nature, our experience offers no evidence that such a state is 
achievable. Since we cannot rationally and in good faith adopt an end that we do not 
believe is a real possibility, and yet morality demands a duty to try to promote such a 
state, an apparent contradiction arises. 
We must therefore devise some way in order that we may conceive of the highest good 
as a possibility. The only way Kant believes this can be done is by assuming the existence 
of God as a moral author of the universe who has arranged the laws of nature in just such 
a way that they are conducive to moral ends. Kant goes much farther than simply 
asserting that we are justified in postulating the existence of God. He claims that "it is 
morally necessary to assume the existence ofGod.,,48 
The arguments for the immortality of the soul and existence of God here also do not 
extend our theoretical knowledge. This means that they may not be used to explain any 
events or occurrences in nature. Also, since the grounds for these assumptions is the 
possibility of the highest good in the world as an achievable end, we may assert only what 
is necessary to render the highest good conceivable. Finally, since there is no sense 
impression given in any intuition for these postulates, we are unable to make claims 
48Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, p.l 05 
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intended to describe or determine their nature in any specific way. We can posit there 
existence, but we still cannot reasonably assert anything about their nature. 
IV. Critique of System 
A. Is Kant's Approach Consistent? 
The short answer is: no. There are a few very important points in the Critique of Pure 
Reason that Kant must maintain if his critical system is to succeed. These include the 
distinction between phenomena and noumena, time and space as forms of perception 
alone, and the necessity of the connection of cause and effect in the phenomenal world. 
In the Critique of Practical Reason, however, Kant argues for a causality through 
noumena-willing. Everything that we do in the world of sensibility is empirically 
conditioned and on that account must take place in accordance with the natural law of 
cause and effect. If we act, however, not based on any empirical intuition, but rather on a 
moral law originating from within reason itself, we are not subjecting our will to any 
external force and therefore escape the causal nexus. In this case we are acting as 
noumena. This is how we are able to act freely as an unconditioned cause. The only 
non-empirical, and therefore free, motive for action is the moral law, which "even the 
most common understanding can distinguish. ,,49 
Time and space are real only empirically, insofar as the are the necessary conditions of 
any external or internal (time only) object of intuition. All appearances are conditioned by 
space and time. But they are only transcendentally ideal. They are filters which we bring 
to all perceptions, and we impose them upon the noumenal entity which we perceive. 
49Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, p.25 
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Space and time do not exist in the objects-in-themselves. They cannot exist in objects as 
noumena because, if they did, subjects would admit of impossible predicates (Zeno's 
paradoxes would find no resolution). 
This creates an irresolvable problem for Kant's system. He asserts that all alterations 
take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect. This is 
perfectly acceptable in a phenomenal world, but it becomes impossible to impute 
causality to noumena. The connection between a cause and effect is defined, among other 
things, by their relation to each other in time. For noumena to partake in a causal 
relationship, either as the cause or the effect, would necessitate its existence in time. 
Ironically, while Kant insists that we cannot have any theoretical knowledge ofnoumena, 
the one thing he concedes we must know is that it is not spacio-temporal. 
The very idea of causality as necessary for the unity of consciousness seems incorrect 
to begin with. Even within the context ofKant's system it seems more probable that 
causality is empirically real, but transcendentally ideal, much like space and time. 
Kant argues that in order to have a unity of experience, all alterations must take place 
in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect. It appears to me, 
however, that the unity of experience is simply a component ofour cognitive apparatus 
we therefore impose an apparent causality upon the world around us, again similar to the 
way Kant believes we impose space and time onto the world around us. 
I call this idea "blind spot" causality. This sort of causality is named for an experiment 
I once did to find the blind spot in my eye. The blind spot occurs when an image, instead 
of being projected onto the retina, falls directly on the optic nerve. I placed an "X" and an 
"0" about an inch apart on my hand. Next, I held my hand at my nose and, closing my 
left eye, I focused on the image on the left side while slowly bringing my hand away from 
my face. When I reached my blind spot, the image seemed to disappear. What actually 
happened was that my brain, having no sense data for the area of my hand containing that 
image, took the surrounding area and made it collapse onto the blind spot. The same type 
of situation occurs when one tries to pin-point the moment they fall asleep. It cannot be 
done. When you wake, the last thing that you remember is falling asleep (or the 
quasi-conscious state of dreaming). A span of time passed, but your mind simply 
connected the various conscious states to create a unity. The same sort of unity the Kant 
is trying to account for. 
B. Is Kant's System Adequate? 
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Again, the short answer: no. The first inadequacy is, of course, the internal 
inconsistencies which I have just pointed out. There are further deficiencies, however. 
In the transcendental doctrine of method, Kant draws a distinction between opining, 
believing and knowing. An opinion is a judgment which is consciously insufficient, 
objectively and subjectively. If one takes a subjectively sufficient judgment to be 
objectively sufficient as well, it is believing. It may only be considered knowing when a 
judgment is shown to be sufficient both subjectively and objectively. 
Once an end is accepted, the conditions for attaining it must also be, at least 
hypothetically, necessary. This necessity is only subjectively sufficient ifhe knows ofno 
other way to attain this end. Kant believes the conditions for fulfilling the end are 
absolutely sufficient, however, ifhe knows that under no possible conditions can there be 
another means for attaining that end. It is the difference between a merely contingent 
belief and a necessary belief. The judgments with which practical knowledge concerns 
itself are of a specific type that there is no existing means of arriving at certainty in these 
matters. 
Kant proposes an end and what he believes is the only possible means of attaining that 
end, but he gives no proof of the end itself. If the existence of the means for an end are 
necessary based only on the existence of the end itself, then Kant has perhaps given a 
sufficient argument for why his theology should be accepted, but has not proven the 
argument for why theology itself should be accepted, but to save himself from becoming 
"abhorrent" in his own eyes. 
Also, still in the transcendental doctrine ofmethod, Kant defines practical as all that 
which is possible through freedom. Yet if freedom is only to be "proven" in the practical 
sphere of reason, Kant is committing the fallacy ofpetitio principii, or begging the 
question. While it certainly seems like a worthy undertaking to try and determine such 
practical principles (since it at least appears as though we exercise freedom), anything 
which is concluded must be suspect, and not taken for knowledge in any absolute sense. 
Reason simply cannot hope to supply laws that are pure and determined completely a 
priori. If the world of sensible appearances, the one in which we live, is completely 
phenomenalistically determined, where is there room for freedom, and, hence, morality? 
Reason itself may be determined in respect of still other influences, and that which Kant 
entitles freedom may actually be just the causation again in relation to higher and more 
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remote causes. Practical freedom is itself a cause in nature, that of reason in the 
determination of the will. 
"The greatest and perhaps sole use of all philosophy of pure reason is therefore only 
negative; since it serves not as an organon for the extension but as a discipline for the 
limitation of pure reason, and, instead of discovering truth, has only the modest merit of 
guarding against error. 
"There must, however, be some source of positive modes of knowledge which belong 
to the domain of pure reason, and which, it may be, give occasion to error solely owing to 
misunderstanding, while yet in actual fact they from the goal towards which reason is 
directing its efforts. How else can we account for our inextinguishable desire to find firm 
footing somewhere beyond the limits of experience?"So 
This passage from the opening of the Canon of Pure Reason demonstrates how 
desperately Kant is trying to allow for practical knowledge. After hundreds of pages of 
careful consideration and insight into our cognitive resources, checking the limits ofwhat 
we may claim to know, he now makes the claim that there must be more, simply because 
we want to know more. After all the care that he took to ensure certainty in our 
knowledge claims, he admits that we will be prone to error in our practical pursuits, but 
that this is the only way in which we may satisfy reason. 
SOKant, Critique ofPure Reason, p.629 
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